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Abstract
We develop an alternative framework to the aggregate matching function in which
workers search for jobs through a network of firms: the labor flow network. The lack
of an edge between two companies indicates the impossibility of labor flows between
them due to high frictions. In equilibrium, firms’ hiring behavior correlates through
the network, generating highly disaggregated local unemployment. Hence, aggregation
depends on the topology of the network in non-trivial ways. This theory provides new
micro-foundations for the the Beveridge curve, wage dispersion, and the employer-
size premium. Using employer-employee matched records, we find that the empirical
topology of the network, in conjunction with the supply elasticity, may be a major
contributor of aggregate unemployment.
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1 Introduction
Unemployment is a fundamental economic problem resulting form several distinct social
mechanisms. These include people becoming separated from their jobs and searching for new
positions; firms opening vacancies and searching for new workers using diverse strategies;
and recruiters finding job seekers throughout the labor market. Due to the complexity
involved in simultaneously accounting for these and other mechanisms, the composition of
unemployment has been studied under the umbrella of labor market frictions. A simplified
way to account for these frictions has been to assume that companies and job seekers meet
at random in the job market. Failure to coordinate these encounters can then be attributed
to frictions.
The seminal work of Hall (1979), Pissarides (1979), and Bowden (1980) paved the way for
the application of random matching models in order to integrate frictions into equilibrium
models. A reduced way to capture these matching processes is through the aggregate match-
ing function (AMF). In its most typical form, the AMF takes two quantities as inputs: total
unemployment and total number of vacancies; and returns the total number of successful
matches. If the AMF produces unsuccessful matches, even when there are more vacancies
than unemployed, it means that the labor market has frictions. Like any aggregation, the
AMF implicitly assumes certain regularity in the matching process. Without such regularity
it would be impossible to define such a function since the same number of vacancies could
yield significantly different levels of unemployment under the same conditions. Therefore,
this reduced representation of the matching process sacrifices structural information about
frictions. As we will show in this paper, when the structure of frictions correlates the behav-
ior of firms, important effects on aggregate unemployment can be missed through aggregate
approaches.
In order to address the limitations of the AMF, numerous models about its micro-
foundations have been formulated. In some cases, they rely on theoretical assumptions
that are hard to observe through empirical data. In other cases, micro-foundations can be
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extremely specific mechanisms that are difficult to extrapolate to more general contexts,
or to link to other mechanisms under a common framework (e.g., geographical distance,
social networks, skills mismatch, etc.). Furthermore, even when it is possible to account for
multiple micro-foundations simultaneously, it does not take much to end up with overly-
complicated models. Therefore, developing an overarching framework that accounts for
the highly heterogeneous and complex structure of labour market frictions is something
desirable from both positive (to understand labor dynamics) and normative (for policy
purposes) points of view. In this paper we propose a new framework to achieve this goal,
inspired in empirical observations on how individuals move from one company to another
throughout their careers.
We propose that the trajectories of individuals across firms provide rich information
about the structure of the labor market frictions. We represent such a structure as a
network of firms that restricts labor mobility. In this network, the presence or absence of
an edge represents a categorical relation between two firms, resulting from the frictions that
determine the amount of labor mobility between them. More specifically, the absence of an
edge means that labor flows between two unconnected firms are unlikely due to high frictions
(at least in the short run), while the opposite is expected for connected firms. Together,
firms and edges form the labor flow network (LFN) of the economy. In the same spirit
in which the AMF uses past employment outcomes to determine today’s unemployment,
our approach uses past trajectories to determine today’s employment outcomes. Another
analogy can be drawn with the urns-balls literature. Here the urns are distributed across
individual firms, and jumps between them are restricted by the connections between them.
In fact, the classical urns-balls model is a special case of ours, where the network topology
has a high degree of regularity. Therefore, the topology of the LFN plays a crucial role
in determining unemployment. As we will show in this paper, the empirical topology of
the LFN, makes aggregation of unemployment non-trivial. Furthermore, when firms’ hiring
behavior correlate through the LFN, the structure of the labour market frictions may account
for large amounts of unemployment.
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1.1 Related Works
The idea of limiting job search to groups of firms is not new or uncommon. For exam-
ple, mismatch models posit that coordination failures between firms and workers are due
to frictions that prevent job seekers from freely moving between submarkets. Convention-
ally, mobility between submarkets is studied by grouping firms into different categories and
analyzing the labor flows that take place between such groups. Since the early contribu-
tion of Lucas and Prescott (1974), multisector matching models have offered a variety of
ways to think about frictions between submarkets. An example can be found in Shimer
(2007), where inter-submarket flows are modeled as a process where workers and jobs are
randomly reassigned to any submarket every period. This reassignment originates from
an exogenous stochastic process under which it is equally likely to move between any two
submarkets. Once workers and jobs have been reallocated, matching takes place in each
submarket through local AMFs. In contrast, Sahin et al. (2014) assume that, provided with
information on vacancies, shocks, and efficiencies, workers periodically choose a submarket
to move into. Once labor is reallocated, match creation and destruction take place in each
submarket. An alternative approach proposed by Herz and van Rens (2011) assumes that
workers can search for vacancies in any submarket and firms can search for workers in the
same way. There are costs associated to searching in each submarket. Therefore, matching
depends on the optimal decisions of workers and firms about where to search. Other models
combine some of these elements in the tradition of Lucas and Prescott (Alvarez and Shimer,
2011; Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers, 2013; Lkhagvasuren, 2009; Kambourov and Manovskii,
2009). On the other hand, a related strand of research studies submarkets as spatially
delimited units (generally cities) (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009; Moretti, 2011; Manning and
Petrongolo, 2011). These models focus on the effect of local shocks when the economy is in
spatial equilibrium, which is useful when we know the spatial location of interest. However,
as units of aggregation, spatial partitions can be quite arbitrary.
Whether it is for the whole economy or for submarkets, there are a number of problems
that arise from viewing matching in aggregate terms, and here we mention a few. First, when
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an AMF is responsible of pairing up workers and vacancies, it is assumed that all matches
are equally likely. This neglects the importance that specific firms have in reallocating labor
within a submarket. Second, defining a submarket is an arbitrary choice that might be
well suited for a specific problem, but not necessarily for a broader context. Since these
classifications are usually build for taxonomic purposes, they are not designed to minimize
inter-submarket flows and maximize intra-submarket, which would capture the structural
information of labour market frictions. This problem has been pointed out by Jackman and
Roper (1987) in their classical paper on structural unemployment:
... “there seems no particular reason why unemployed workers should regard
themselves as specific to a particular industry, and in practice the unemployed
do move between industries reasonably easily.” (Jackman and Roper, 1987, pg.
19)
Third, aggregation assumes that any worker from one submarket is equally likely to
transition to another submarket. Furthermore, it ignores the fact that only a few firms are
responsible for inter-submarket transitions. These firms are crucial to overall labor mobility
since they are diffusion outlets or bottlenecks in the process of labor reallocation. Fourth,
aggregation ‘smooths’ the search landscape, enabling firm-to-firm flows that are highly un-
likely in the short run. In fact, Guerrero and Lo´pez (2015) have shown that the hypothesis
of an AMF is rejected as an explanation of empirical firm-to-firm flows, even at the level of
submarkets. Using community detection methods for network data, independent studies by
Guerrero and Axtell (2013) and Schmutte (2014) show that conventional classifications such
as industries and geographical regions poorly capture the clusters of labor that are detected
in employer-employee matched micro-data. For these reasons, a framework that does not
rely on arbitrary aggregations to define submarkets would represent a significant method-
ological improvement. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) suggests the use of graph theory
as a potential tool to overcome arbitrary aggregations. We take this approach in order to
depart from the established notions of submarkets and instead look at labor dynamics as
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random walks on graphs.
1.2 A Network Approach
Our approach is inspired in a local job search mechanism. When a person looks for a
job in search of a vacancy, he or she approaches a group of firms that are ‘accessible’
in the short run. Such group is determined by the frictions of the labor market and we
assume that it is specific to the firm where this person was last employed. We represent
the correspondence between firms and their respective groups of accessible firms through
a LFN. In this network, firms are represented by nodes. An edge between firms i and j
means that frictions are such that j will be accessible to employees of i and vice versa.
Therefore, edges have a categorical nature that represents the possibility (or impossibility
in their absence) of labor flows between firms. Firm i’s edges determine its first neighbors,
which are equivalent to the group of accessible firms to someone employed in i. We refer to
these firms as i’s neighbor firms. As a person progresses through his or her career, he or she
traverses the economy by taking jobs at the neighbor firms of past employers. This gradual
navigation process is fundamentally different from previous approaches because the identity
of the firm (i.e., its position in the LFN) matters in order to determine the employment
prospects of the job seeker. There is a number reasons why this is important. To mention
a few, it allows to study the composition of aggregate unemployment at the level of the
firm; it sheds light on the effect of localized shocks and targeted policies; and it exploits the
granularity and inter-firm structure captured in employer-employee matched records. By
analyzing the steady-state equilibrium, we obtain analytical solutions that inform us about
local unemployment, local flows, firm sizes, profits, and firm hiring behavior. In addition,
this framework provides new micro foundations of stylized facts such as the Beveridge curve
and the employer-size premium.
Network theory has been extensively used to study labor markets in the context of
information transmission through social networks. The pioneering work of Granovetter
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(1973) showed the importance that infrequently-used personal contacts have in acquiring
non-redundant information about vacancies. Although Granovetter’s hypothesis has been
recently challenged by studies that use comprehensive social media micro-data (Gee et al.,
2014), the importance of social networks in diffusing job information is not in question.
Other empirical studies about social networks in labor markets look at migration (Munshi,
2003), urban and rural unemployment (Wahba and Zenou, 2005), investment in personal
contacts (Galeotti and Merlino, 2014), and local earnings (Schmutte, 2010) among other
topics. On the theoretical side, there is a substantial number of models concerning so-
cial networks in labor markets, pioneered by Boorman (1975) and Montgomery (1991b).
Some studies have focused on labor outcomes as a result of the structure of social networks
(Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Calvo´-Armengol and Zenou, 2005; Calvo´-Armengol
and Jackson, 2007; Schmutte, 2010). Other works analyze inequality and segregation effects
in the job market (Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Tassier and Menczer, 2008). For a
review of these and other models, we refer to the literature survey provided by Ioannides
and Loury (2004).
Despite the wide application of network methods to study labor markets, most of this
work was only focused on the role of social networks in communicating information about
vacancies. These studies have important applications in long-term policies such as affirma-
tive action laws, but are not so useful for short-term policies such as contingency plans in
the presence of shocks. Furthermore, the role of the firm in these models becomes trivial if
not absent, which is problematic for policies that aim at incentivizing firms. In fact, little
has been done to study labor mobility on networks. To the best of our knowledge, there are
only a few studies that analyze labor flows through networks. For example, Guerrero and
Axtell (2013) study firm-to-firm labor flows using employee-employer matched records from
Finland and Mexico. They characterize the topology of these labor flow networks and find
that network connectivity is highly correlated with employment growth at the firm level.
Using US micro-data, Schmutte (2014) constructs job-to-job networks in order to identify
four job clusters. Mobility between these clusters is highly frictional and dependent on the
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business cycle. Both studies find that any clusters identified through community detection
methods have little correspondence to standard categorizations such as industrial classifica-
tion, geographical regions, or occupational groups. The LFN framework provides a new way
to analyze labor dynamics, while contributing to the use of methods from network science
in economics.
Our work complements five strands of literature. First it adds to the family of search and
matching models in labor economics by introducing the method or random walks on graphs
as a new tool to analyze labor mobility and aggregate unemployment. It also pushes the
boundaries on how employer-employee matched micro-datasets are used today. Second, it
contributes to the field of networks in labor markets by expanding the application of network
methods beyond the scope of personal contacts. Social networks are difficult to observe at a
large-scales1. Since LFNs partially capture labor flows induced by personal contacts (people
who worked together may recommend each other in the future), they serve as an additional
source of information to study the effect of social networks in the labor market. Third, it
complements the literature on micro-foundations of the AMF (Butters, 1977; Hall, 1979;
Pissarides, 1979; Montgomery, 1991a; Lang, 1991; Blanchard and Diamond, 1994; Coles,
1994; Coles and Smith, 1998; Stevens, 2007; Naidu, 2007). Because frictions are captured in
the form of a network, there is no need to assume an aggregate matching process. Fourth,
it strengthens the growing literature of inter-firm networks (Saito et al., 2007; Konno, 2009;
Atalay et al., 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2012; di Giovanni et al., 2014). By avoiding aggregation
into arbitrary submarkets, the network approach allows to study firm and labor dynamics
jointly. Fifth, it contributes to the study of local labor markets by providing a new way of
defining localities at the level of the firm, which should facilitate the study of local shocks
and their propagation.
This paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the model in two parts.
First, we introduce the problem of the firm, which maximizes profits in the steady-state
when wages are exogenous. Then, we characterize the job search process as a random walk
1Although online social networks provide a rich source of information, they are highly susceptible to
biases and multiple factors that incentivize individuals to opt out of this form of communication.
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on a graph, which helps us to solve the firm’s problem of choosing the optimal number of
vacancies.
In section 3, we use employer-employee matched micro-data to test the model’s predic-
tions. We find that our results are significant and robust across 20 annual cross-sections
of data. In section 4 we endogenize wages and find that firms’ hiring behavior correlates
through the LFN. Furthermore, when this correlation happens on a topology with a skewed
degree distribution, strong effects on aggregate unemployment take place. We construct an
empirical LFN and find that its structure is responsible for a significant part of aggregate
unemployment in the presence of an inelastic labor supply. Finally, in section 5 we discuss
the results, their policy implications, and potential of this framework for future research.
2 Model with an Exogenous Wage
The model considers an economy in a steady state where firms demand a constant amount
of labour and workers search for jobs randomly. Since we are interested in understanding
the effect of the network topology on unemployment, we focus on firm behavior and model
workers as random walkers. In this section, we assume a single exogenous wage, and in
section 4 we introduce an exogenous supply to generate wage dispersion.
2.1 Firms
There are {1, ..., N} firms in the economy. In the steady state, each firm has size Li. Every
period, a fraction of the i’s employees becomes separated with an exogenous probability
λ. By hiring job applicants, the firm compensate the loss of employees. Profits are made
exclusively from labor rents. Therefore, firms maximize profits by determining the optimal
number of vacancies to open every period. However, opening vacancies also depends on
exogenous shocks in the form of investments. These investments enable firms to open
vacancies and they arrive with a probability v. Therefore, when a firm has vacancies we say
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that it is open, and closed otherwise. The expected steady-state firm size is
(1− λ)Li + vhiAi,
where Ai is the number of job applicants and hi is the fraction of applicants hired by the
firm.
Unfilled vacancies are destroyed every period, so we use hi is a continuous approximation
for vacancies in a firm. The intuition is that the firm has an expectation about the number
of applicants that it would receive in the steady state; for example, by counting the CVs that
job seekers drop at its offices everyday. Hence Ai is the expected number of applicants. The
firm opens at most Ai positions in order to minimize the cost of unfilled vacancies (of course
there still can be unfilled vacancies if the number of applicants is lower than expected).
Therefore, the number of vacancies opened by the firm can be written as a fraction of Ai.
We assume independence between workers, so we can treat hi as a probability. We call it
the hiring policy, and it represents the likelihood that a job seeker who applies to firm i
becomes hired.
Building on a model developed by (Barron et al., 1987), we assume that the objective
of the firm is to maximize profits by setting an optimal hiring policy. For this, the firm also
takes into account its linear technology with a productivity factor y, the exogenous wage
w, and cost parameters c ∈ (0, 1) and κ ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the profit maximization problem is
given by
max
hi
Πi = (1− λ)(y − w)Li + v(y − w)hiAi − vcLihi − (1− v)κcLihi. (1)
On one hand, c captures the cost of opening more vacancies. We assume that this cost
scales with firm size (e.g., because larger firms invest more in screening processes and HR
in general), as suggested by recent empirical evidence (Muehlemann and Pfeifer, 2016). On
the other hand, κ represents a sunk cost from HR in which the firm incurs when it is closed
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(e.g., setup expenses for screening future applications).
In order generate concavity in eq. (1), we assume that the firm understands the job
search process. Therefore, we proceed to characterize job search and obtain the steady-
state solutions for Li and Ai, which the firm takes into account in order to maximize its
profits.
2.2 Job Search
Let us consider a network where each node represents a firm and the absence of an edge
between two firms means that labor market frictions between them are so high that we would
not expect any labour flows between them in the short run. This network is represented by
the adjacency matrix A, where Aij = Aji = 1 if firms i and j share and edge, and Aij =
Aji = 0 otherwise. Workers flow through this network as they gain and lose employment
from its nodes, hence the name of labor flow network (LFN). The LFN is unweighted because
edges represent a categorical aspect of the labor market: whether we should expect labor
flows between two firms or not. It is undirected because the edges capture some ‘affinity’
between firms such that frictions are low in both directions. For simplicity, we do not allow
self-loops, so the diagonal entries of A are all zero. We assume that the LFN has a single
component. However, the results are generalizable for networks with multiple components.
Firm i has ki =
∑
j Aij , also known as the degree of i. The set Γi contains all firms j such
that Aij = 1.
Workers can be in one of two states: employed or unemployed. Regardless of his or her
state, each worker is always associated with a firm. Therefore, jobless workers are associated
to their last employers. Each worker employed by firm i might become unemployed with
probability λ. If unemployed, he or she looks at the set γi ⊆ Γi of i’s neighbor firms that
received investments. Hence, we say that γi is the set of open neighbors of i and it may
change from one period to another. If |γi| = 0, the job seeker remains unemployed for
the rest of the period. Otherwise, he or she selects a firm j ∈ γi at random with uniform
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probability and submits a job application. For simplicity, we assume that each job seeker can
submit at most one application per period. It is possible to return to i as long as the last job
was held at j such that Aij . Finally, if the job application is successful (with probability
hj), the job seeker becomes employed at j, updating its firm association. Otherwise, it
remains unemployed for the rest of the period. We summarize this process in the following
steps.
1. Each firm receives an investment with probability v.
2. Each employed worker becomes unemployed with probability λ.
3. Each unemployed associated to i (excluding the newly separated ones) picks a firm
j ∈ γi at random and becomes employed with probability hj .
The reader may be concerned about the possibility that a job seeker may occasionally
search among firms that are not connected to his or her last employer. If the probability
of such event is low, the model preserves the roughly the same characteristics because the
LFN induces a dominant effect on job search. When this probability is large, the model
becomes an ‘urns-balls’ model, so the structure of the network is irrelevant. What should
be the empirically relevant magnitude of such probability? Previous work shows that the
idea of searching on a network is empirically compelling since firm-to-firm labor flows tend
to be significantly persistent through time (Lo´pez et al., 2015). In fact, unrestricted random
matching between firms and workers is formally rejected when looking at employer-employee
matched records (Guerrero and Lo´pez, 2015). These results suggests that, in a more general
model, the probability of searching ‘outside’ of the network has to be calibrated with a low
value. Such a model can be easily constructed, but its solutions do not have explicit form.
In contrast, focusing exclusively on job search ‘on’ the network yields explicit solutions,
which is convenient for building economic intuition.
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2.3 Dynamics
The stochastic process previously described is a random walk on a graph with waiting times
determined by the investment shocks v, the separation rate λ, and the set of hiring policies
{hi}Ni=1. In order to characterize its dynamics, we concentrate on the evolution of the
probability pi(t) that a worker is employed at firm i in period t, and the probability qi(t)
that a worker is unemployed in period t and associated to firm i. For this purpose, let us
first construct the dynamic equations of both probabilities to then obtain the steady-state
solution.
In period t, the probability that a worker is employed at firm i depends on the probability
(1 − λ)pi(t − 1) that he or she was employed at the same firm in the previous period and
did not become separated. In case that the worker was unemployed during t− 1, then pi(t)
also depends on: the probability qi(t− 1) that the worker was associated to a neighbor firm
j; on the probability Pr(γ
(i)
j ) of having a particular configuration γ
(i)
j of open and closed
neighbors of j such that i is open; and on the probability 1/|γ(i)i | that the worker picks i from
all of j’s open neighbors. Altogether, summing over all possible neighbors and all possible
configurations of open neighbors, and conditioning to the hiring policy, the probability that
a worker is employed by firm i in period t is
pi(t) = (1− λ)pi(t− 1) + hi
∑
j∈Γi
qj(t− 1)
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
) 1∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣ , (2)
where {γ(i)j } denotes the set of all possible configurations of open and closed neighbors of j
where i is open.
The probability that a worker is unemployed during t while associated to firm i depends
on the probability λpi(t − 1) of becoming separated from i in the previous period. On the
other hand, if the worker was already unemployed, the probability of remaining in such
state depends on: the probability Pr(γi = ∅) that no neighbor firm of i is open and the
probability 1 − hj of not being hired by the chosen open neighbor j. Accounting for all
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possible non-empty sets γi of open neighbors, the probability of being unemployed in t and
associated to firm i is given by
qi(t) = λpi(t− 1) + qi(t− 1)
∑
γi 6=∅
Pr(γi)
1
|γi|
∑
j∈γi
(1− hj) + Pr(γi = ∅)
 . (3)
Up to this point, the model might seem complicated due to all the parameters involved.
However, our intention is to provide a general framework that allows the user to control
for different degrees of freedom. As we will show ahead, the steady-state solutions take
very simple and intuitive forms, while several parameters can be disregarded if no data is
available to measure them. Generally speaking, the qualitative nature of our results holds
for different calibrations.
2.4 Steady State
In the steady-state, pi(t) = pi(t − 1) = pi and qi(t) = qi(t − 1) = qi for every firm i. The
following results follow from solving eqs. (2) and (3).
Proposition 1. The process specified in section 2.2 has a unique steady-state where proba-
bilities pi and qi are time-invariant for every firm i.
Existence follows from a standard result in random walks on graphs (Bolloba´s, 1998)
(see appendix). Uniqueness comes from condition
1 =
N∑
i=1
pi +
N∑
i=1
qi,
which indicates that all probabilities should add up to one, implying that every worker is
either employed or unemployed, and associated to only one firm. This result implies that
a unique steady-state is always reached regardless of how the hiring policies in {hi}Ni=1
are assigned to each firm in the LFN. Lo´pez et al. (2015) provide more general results for
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heterogeneous separation rates and heterogeneous investment shocks. However, this version
is more suitable for economic modeling because it yields explicit solutions with intuitive
economic meaning.
Proposition 2. The steady-state average size of a firm i that follows eqs. (2) and (3) is
Li =
ϕ
λ
hih¯Γiki, (4)
where h¯Γi =
1
ki
∑
j Aijhj is the average hiring policy of i’s neighbor firms and ϕ is a
normalizing constant.
For now, let us defer the explanation of ϕ for a few paragraphs. Equation (4) suggests
that, ceteris paribus, the size of a firm increases with its degree. As expected, firms can
increase their own sizes through larger hiring policies. Equation (4) captures an externality:
a firm’s hiring policy affects the size of its neighbor firms. This result follows from an
intuitive mechanism. If firm i hires more people from its pool of applicants, it increases its
own size. In consequence, more people will become separated from i through the exogenous
separation process governed by λ (which also reduces the size of the firm). More unemployed
individuals associated to i translates into a larger pool of job seekers that will potentially
apply for a job at i’s neighbor j. Therefore, if everything else is constant, Aj increases,
contributing to j’s growth. This mechanism becomes evident in the following result.
Proposition 3. The steady-state average number of applications received by a firm i that
follows eqs. (2) and (3) is
Ai = ϕh¯Γiki. (5)
The proof follows from the fact that, in the steady-state, the number of separated em-
ployees λLi must equal the number of newly hired ones hiAi in order for Li to remain
constant through time (see appendix).
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2.5 Hiring Policy and Profits
We assume that firms understand the job search process to a fair extent. That is, they use
eqs. (4) and (5) in eq. (1) and take ϕ and h¯Γi as given. Then, substituting eqs. (4) and (5)
in eq. (1), and solving the F.O.C. yields the optimal hiring policy
h∗ =
ψ
2φ
(y − w), (6)
where ψ = (1− λ+ vλ) and φ = c(v + κ− vκ). We have removed sub-index i because the
optimal hiring policy is independent of ki. This result is quite intuitive in a neoclassical
sense, since higher wages are compensated with lower hiring policies. It also suggests that,
with a unique exogenous wage, all firms set the same optimal hiring policy. This means
that we can rewrite some of these results exclusively as functions of ki. More specifically,
we rewrite the firm size as
Li = ϕh
∗2ki, (7)
and the profit as
Π∗i =
ϕψ3
8λφ2
(y − w)3ki, (8)
which later will be useful for empirical testing.
2.6 Aggregation of Unemployment
Solving eqs. (2) and (3) yields the average number of unemployed individuals associated to
firm i in the steady-state. This is a bottom-up construction of unemployment that takes into
account how it is distributed across firms, so we term it firm-specific unemployment. This
new measure provides information about the employment prospects of a firms’ ex-employees
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and a method to identify pools of local unemployment. Firm-specific unemployment is
obtained from the following result.
Proposition 4. The steady-state average unemployment associated to a firm i that follows
eqs. (2) and (3) is
Ui =
ϕhiki
1− (1− v)ki . (9)
The normalizing constant ϕ captures the population conservation condition H =
∑
i Li+∑
i Ui, so it takes the form
ϕ =
H∑
i hih¯Γiki
[
1
λ +
1
h¯Γi [1−(1−v)ki ]
] . (10)
Equation (9) becomes more intuitive when multiplying by
λh¯Γi
λh¯Γi
, in which case we obtain
Ui =
λLi
h¯Γi [1− (1− v)ki ]
. (11)
Note that h¯Γi [1− (1− v)ki ] is the transition probability from unemployment to employ-
ment for a worker associated to firm i. The reciprocal of this probability is the average
duration t¯ui of an unemployment spell for an individual whose last job was in i. Therefore,
we can rewrite eq. (9) as
Ui = λt¯
u
i Li, (12)
which will become useful for empirical testing. In general, firm-specific unemployment is
an interesting measure because it not only provides a highly granular unit of the compo-
sition of aggregate unemployment, but also yields information about how good will be the
employment prospects of someone working at a particular company.
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Due to the independence between degree and hiring policy implied by eq. (6), aggregation
of unemployment is straightforward given that the firm-specific unemployment rate is defined
as
ui =
Ui
Ui + Li
=
λ
λ+ h∗[1− (1− v)ki ] , (13)
which is non-increasing and convex in ki. Note that for a LFN where all firms have the
same degree, eq. (13) is equivalent to Beveridge curve obtained in ‘urn-balls’ models.
Let the LFNs of two economies be represented by their adjacency matrices A and
A′, with corresponding degree distributions P and P ′, and aggregate unemployment rates
u =
∑kmax
k=1 ukP (k) and u
′ =
∑kmax
k=1 ukP
′(k). Then, the next results follow from network
stochastic dominance (Jackson and Rogers, 2007a,b; Lo´pez-Pintado, 2008).
Proposition 5. If P strictly first-order stochastically dominates P ′, then u < u′.
Proposition 5 is quite intuitive since the average firm connectivity of A is higher than in
A′. An LFN with higher connectivity reflects an economy with lower labor market frictions.
Under these conditions, job seekers have better chances of finding open firms and new job
opportunities.
Proposition 6. If P ′ is a strict mean-preserving spread of P , then u < u′.
Proofs of propositions 5 and 6 follow from direct differentiation of eq. (13), which shows
that u is non-increasing and convex in ki. Proposition 6 means that more degree heterogene-
ity translates into higher unemployment. Heterogeneity in a LFN reflects the ‘roughness’
of the search landscape. It is analogous to heterogeneity in search and matching models.
However, there is the fundamental difference: agents traverse the economy by gradually
navigating the LFN, instead of being randomly allocated to any firm. As we will learn
ahead, this subtle difference in the reallocation process induces significant effects in aggre-
gate unemployment when hiring policies are heterogeneous. We will show that the LFN not
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only has an ordinal effect on aggregate unemployment, but also a significant impact on its
overall level.
3 Empirical Support
In this section, we test the model’s predictions when wages are considered exogenous and
homogeneous. For this purpose, we use employer-employee matched micro-data from two
countries. Given the simple form of our results, these tests should not be interpreted as an
attempt to provide definite empirical measures. Instead, we use them as a way to show that
our theory is empirically sound (a “sanity check”).
3.1 Data
We use different datasets of employer-employee matched records. The first is the Finnish
Longitudinal Employer-Employee Data (FLEED), which consists of an annual panel of
employer-employee matched records of the universe of firms and employees in Finland. The
panel was constructed by Statistics Finland from social security registries by recording the
association between each worker and each firm (enterprise codes, not establishments), at the
end of each calendar year. If a worker is not employed, it is not part of the corresponding
cross-section. The result is a panel of 20 years that tracks every firm and every employed
individual at the end of each year (approximately 2× 105 firms and 2× 106 workers).
FLEED can be merged with other datasets that provide information about companies.
For this, we employ Statistics Finland’s Business Register, an annual panel providing the
average number of employees and net profits per firm. The Business Register is constructed
from administrative data from the Tax Administration, and from direct inquiries from Statis-
tics Finland to business with more than 20 employees. FLEED and the Business Register
provide data on labor flows, firm sizes, and net profits from different sources. Unfortunately,
their temporal aggregation prevents us from measuring firm-specific unemployment because
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it is not possible to observe whether a person underwent an unemployment spell between
jobs. For this purpose, we employ an additional dataset.
We use a dataset from Mexico consisting of employer-employee matched records with
daily resolution. The data was obtained by sampling raw social security records from the
Mexican Social Security Institute. Approximately 4 × 105 individuals who were active
between 1989 and 2008 were randomly selected and their entire employment history was
extracted (hence, covering dates prior to 1989). This procedure generates a dataset with
nearly 2×105 firms. The records contain information about the exact date in which a person
became hired/separated by/from a firm. Therefore, it is possible to identify unemployment
spells, duration of each spell, and associations between job seekers and their last employer.
3.2 Empirical Testing
In previous studies we have constructed LFNs by performing different statistical tests about
the significance of flows between firms Guerrero and Lo´pez (2015); Lo´pez et al. (2015).
Since the topology of the network is quite robust under different tests, here we take a
simpler approach. For a given year, we construct an edge between two firms if we observe
labor flows between them. Therefore ki is the total number of firms to(from) which firm i
sent(received) workers in a given year. Then, we test if indeed there is a positive correlation
between the degree of a firm and: its size, its number of unemployed, and its profits. We
are aware of potential problems in testing the relationship between degree and firm size
(or unemployed), since both are measure from similar data. Furthermore, by testing the
relationship between profits and degree we provide a cleaner confirmation of the empirically
soundness of our approach.
We test the prediction concerning degree and firm size, expressed in eq. (7) by estimating
the model
20
Li = βLki + i, (14)
where i is an error term and βL = ϕh
∗2. If the model is empirically consistent, then the null
hypothesis of βL = 0 should be rejected. Firm sizes are measured as the average number
of employees that each firm had in a given year. In a similar spirit, we test the predicted
positive relationship between degree and profits suggested in eq. (8) by estimating the model
Πi = βΠki + i, (15)
where βΠ =
ϕψ3
8λφ2 (y − w)3 and profits Πi are measured in Euros.
We estimate both models for each annual cross-sections in FLEED. Table 1 shows that
the data validates the model’s prediction eq. (7) in all cross-sections, confirming a positive
relationship between degree and firm size. Equation (8) is valid in most of the cross-sections.
The fact that profits and degrees are measures of different nature (as opposed to sizes and
degrees) gives us provide some level of validity to our approach.
We proceed to test the theoretical prediction connecting degree and firm-specific unem-
ployment, as expressed in eq. (9). For this, we estimate the model
Ui = βλxi + i, (16)
where βλ = λ is the estimated separation rate and xi = t¯
u
i Li. Like in eq. (14), firm size is
measured as the average number of employees associated to a firm in a given year.
Using data from Mexico, we measure the number of associated employed and unemployed
individuals Ui in each firm during a single day of every year. By measuring for a single day,
we guarantee that the unemployed individuals are different from the employed ones. For
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Year Firm Size Firm Profit
βL N R
2 βΠ N R
2
1988 7.135*** 19,251 0.466 9.031e+04** 19,251 0.060
(4.963e-01) (4.963e-01)
1989 8.200*** 19,184 0.549 1.352e+05*** 19,184 0.136
(6.766e-01) (6.766e-01)
1990 11.595*** 16,164 0.398 2.291e+05*** 16,164 0.088
(1.294e+00) (1.294e+00)
1991 15.706*** 12,752 0.437 2.975e+05*** 12,752 0.059
(1.409e+00) (1.409e+00)
1992 17.776*** 12,306 0.416 2.250e+05 12,306 0.019
(1.620e+00) (1.620e+00)
1993 15.763*** 13,750 0.248 2.662e+05* 13,750 0.030
(1.746e+00) (1.746e+00)
1994 15.156*** 16,074 0.461 3.074e+05*** 16,074 0.049
(2.320e+00) (2.320e+00)
1995 15.308*** 16,675 0.432 2.561e+05*** 16,675 0.049
(2.278e+00) (2.278e+00)
1996 14.193*** 20,188 0.541 3.710e+05*** 20,188 0.097
(1.879e+00) (1.879e+00)
1997 11.478*** 20,220 0.627 2.405e+05* 20,220 0.065
(1.436e+00) (1.436e+00)
1998 10.803*** 25,485 0.570 4.247e+05* 25,485 0.069
(1.902e+00) (1.902e+00)
1999 8.509*** 27,340 0.380 7.583e+05* 27,340 0.076
(1.147e+00) (1.147e+00)
2000 9.074*** 27,575 0.419 2.506e+05** 27,575 0.024
(1.577e+00) (1.577e+00)
2001 10.879*** 26,882 0.500 7.449e+04 26,882 0.007
(2.048e+00) (2.048e+00)
2002 10.229*** 26,546 0.515 5.255e+05 26,546 0.042
(1.669e+00) (1.669e+00)
2003 10.021*** 27,350 0.518 3.511e+05 27,350 0.036
(1.661e+00) (1.661e+00)
2004 8.855*** 29,719 0.506 2.245e+05 29,719 0.021
(1.751e+00) (1.751e+00)
2005 7.991*** 34,089 0.596 2.172e+05 34,089 0.032
(1.180e+00) (1.180e+00)
2006 7.221*** 36,813 0.575 3.474e+05* 36,813 0.021
(9.297e-01) (9.297e-01)
Table 1: Empirical test of theoretical predictions eqs. (7) and (8). The corresponding
estimated models are eqs. (14) and (15). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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each firm, we choose the day when they have the maximum amount of both employed and
unemployed, in other words the day of the year that maximizes UiLi for each firm i. We
compute t¯ui by averaging the duration (in number of days) of unemployment spells (shorter
than 24 months) associated to firm i. If the sample size of unemployment spells per firm is
high, the total number of firms in the sample becomes too low. On the other hand, the data
becomes highly noisy (many firms with UiLi ≤ 1) if the sample size of unemployment spells
per firm is too low. Therefore, we select firms with at least 80 associated unemployment
spells in order to maximize both the number of unemployment spells per firm and the
number of firms in the sample.
Table 2 shows that the theoretical prediction in eq. (12) is empirically consistent. More-
over, all the estimated separation rates fall in the interval (0, 1), which is reassuring if we
think of the model as a new way to estimate the separation rate.
Figure 1 shows scatter plots of the micro-data for a representative year against our
theoretical predictions. It is clear that the predicted relationships are not only statistically
significant but positive. Each panel corresponds to an annual cross-section of the datasets:
panel A corresponds to eq. (7), panel B to eq. (8), and panel C to eq. (12).
4 Endogenous Wages
So far we have considered a unique exogenous market wage. This allows us to gain new
insights about the effect of the LFN on firm dynamics and unemployment. One of the main
findings is an externality through which firms affect their neighbors’ sizes through their
hiring policies. However, it is important to study how this externality interacts with the LFN
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Year βλ N R
2
1999 0.001* 83 0.457
(4.203e-04)
2000 0.001*** 89 0.502
(3.726e-04)
2001 0.002*** 92 0.506
(3.153e-04)
2002 0.002*** 93 0.581
(3.448e-04)
2003 0.002*** 93 0.729
(3.250e-04)
2004 0.002*** 84 0.731
(3.894e-04)
2005 0.003*** 86 0.610
(4.936e-04)
2006 0.003*** 80 0.507
(6.643e-04)
2007 0.003*** 76 0.695
(4.880e-04)
2008 0.003*** 72 0.702
(5.379e-04)
2009 0.001** 69 0.426
(3.868e-04)
2010 0.001*** 63 0.670
(2.242e-04)
Table 2: Empirical test of theoretical prediction eq. (12). The corresponding estimated
model is eq. (16). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***
p < 0.001.
Figure 1: Model Prediction vs. Empirical Data
The figures were constructed using the cross-section corresponding to 2006 of each dataset. The scattered
dots correspond to empirical observations and the solid lines to the fitted models eqs. (14) to (16).
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topology when h∗i is heterogeneous. For this purpose, we endogenize wages by introducing
an exogenous labour supply that determines the wages depending of the amount of labor
demanded by each firm. Equilibrium wages are formed when the individual firm demands
meet the labour supply, generating a dispersion that depends on the network topology.
For simplicity, we adopt a labor supply with a functional form that guarantees a wage
bounded by (0, 1). However, any other monotonically increasing function can be used, as
long as the necessary considerations are made in order to guarantee wages and hiring policies
with consistent bounds. The inverse labor supply has the form
wi =
a`i
b+ `i
, (17)
where `i is the individual demand of firm i; b > 0 is a parameter that affects the price
elasticity; and a provides the upper bound of the wage. We assume a = y for analytical
convenience, guaranteeing non-negative rents from labor.
The labor demand of firm i is equivalent to the number of new hires. Firms are wage tak-
ers, so their profit-maximization problem remains unchanged. Therefore the labor demand
of firm i takes the form
`i = h
∗
iAi. (18)
Substituting eq. (18) in eq. (17) and using eq. (4) yields the equilibrium wage
w∗i =
yϕh∗i h¯
∗
Γi
ki
b+ ϕh∗i h¯
∗
Γi
ki
=
yλLi
b+ λLi
, (19)
which explicitly shows that larger firms pay higher wages. In other words this result captures
the the well-known employer size premium (Brown and Medoff, 1989; Brown et al., 1990).
It also suggests that firms with a higher degree pay higher salaries when compared to other
25
firms with the same hi and h¯Γi .
Substituting eq. (19) in eq. (6) yields i’s equilibrium hiring policy
h∗i = min
1, φb−
√
φ2b2 + φψϕ2byh¯∗Γiki
−2φϕh¯∗Γiki
 , (20)
where the firm sets either a fraction h∗i ≥ 0 or a corner solution where it hires all applicants.
Note that eq. (20) in its vector form is continuous map T : [0, 1]N → [0, 1]N . Therefore, a
set {h∗i }Ni=1 exists.
Equation (20) captures captures the interaction between the hiring behavior of firm i
(expressed through hi) and the hiring behavior of its neighbors, correlating hiring policies
across the LFN in a negative fashion. This has important implications on labor reallocation.
For example, if a worker leaves a firm with a low hiring policy, his or her employment
prospects will be limited to companies with a similar hiring rate. Therefore, escaping this
cluster of poor employment prospects takes longer thank in a matching process where hiring
policies are well-mixed across firms. This has a profound effect on our understanding of local
shocks and unemployment traps because the former exacerbate these bottleneck effects,
generating unemployment and traps. For instance, we know by eq. (4) that higher a ki
induces a larger firm size. Then, the negative correlation between ki and hi means that a
larger proportion of workers (those in the largest firms) are searching for jobs in firms with
lower hiring policies (their neighbors). Following this logic, we can expect that a LFN with
a degree distribution that is a mean-preserving spread of another one induces higher a level
of unemployment.
There is an important connection between the topology of the LFN and the optimal
hiring policies. Its importance relies on the degree of heterogeneity of the set {h∗i }Ni=1. If
there is a large spread of hiring policies, then the effect of the network topology on aggregate
unemployment is larger. In this model, the diversity of hiring policies comes from the supply
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Figure 2: Wage Dispersion and Hiring Policies
The left panel shows two aggregate labor supplies with different elasticities obtained from eq. (17). It also
presents the corresponding wages that the firm with the largest demand `max would have to pay when
confronting each supply. The right panel maps these wages through eq. (6), into the hiring policies that
would be set by the firm with the largest demand.
elasticity, because that is the main determinant of wage dispersion2. Figure 2 illustrates
the relationship between supply elasticity, wages, and hiring policies. To build an intuition,
consider the firm with the largest labor demand `max, which determines the maximum wage
in the economy. The latter is higher in an economy with a more inelastic labor supply,
considering everything else constant. A higher wage implies a lower hiring policy for this
firm, increasing the dispersion between the maximum hiring policy hmax and the lowest one
hmin. Firms with different degrees set different hiring policies (assuming that h¯Γi does not
cancel the effect of ki). Therefore, heterogeneity in both, wages and the topology of the
LFN, are important. Both of these elements are present in empirical datasets. Therefore,
this modeling framework seems adequate and points to important network effects that have
not been previously accounted for.
In order to better understand the aggregation of unemployment, it is important to an-
2However, the model is flexible enough to allow firm heterogeneity in parameters such as the separation
rate λ, the productivity y, the hiring cost c, and the sunk cost κ. This is an important strength of the model
because it facilitates more realistic calibrations that consider the cross-sectional variation of firms.
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alyze how the correlation of hiring policies interact with the topology of the LFN. For this
purpose, we study three representative cases of well-known network topologies and then
proceed to apply our model to the empirical topology obtained from our data.
4.1 Styized Networks
We are interested in learning how large are the effects of the LFN topology on aggregate
unemployment, when hiring policies correlate according to eq. (20). For this purpose, we
analyse the outcome of the model under three random networks that relate to homogeneous
and heterogeneous job search processes. The first is a regular graph, i.e. a network where
every firm has the same number of connections. The second is the popular Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
graph, where the firm degree follows a binomial distribution. The third is the so-called
scale-free network, which has Pareto-distributed degrees. Naturally, there are other elements
that define the topology of real-world network (e.g., clusters, path length, closeness, etc.).
Here we focus on the degree to build an initial intuition, while in the ?? we concentrate on
empirical LFNs.
Each of these stylized networks is differentiated by its degree heterogeneity. To study
the effect induced by such difference, we have chosen topologies that have the same mean
degree k¯, i.e. it has a Dirac delta distribution. Therefore, Erdo˝s-Re´nyi degree distribution
is a mean-preserving spread of the regular graph, while the scale-free is a mean-preserving
spread of the other two. In addition, processes that take place on the regular and the Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi graphs can be well-approximated by aggregations because the degree heterogeneity
is negligible. This is not the case in for the scale-free network, so is is important that we
study the differences produced by these three topologies. For the case of the regular graph,
it is easy to obtain closed form solution of eq. (20) by substituting h¯∗Γi by h
∗ in eq. (20) and
using eq. (10). This yields
h∗ =
bN(yψθ − 2λφ) +√b2N2(2λφ+ yψθ)2 + 8byNHλ2φψθ
4φθ(bN +Hλ)
, (21)
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where θ = 1−(1−v)k. For the case of the networks with heterogeneous degrees, the solutions
are obtained numerically. A formal proof of the uniqueness of the the fixed point in eq. (20)
is not straightforward. However, numerical experiments via Monte Carlo simulation suggest
that eq. (20) is a contraction mapping, providing a consistent solution that we use to compute
aggregate unemployment.
Panel A in fig. 3 shows the Beveridge curves generated by the model. Here, we portray
the Beveridge curve as the relationship between the unemployment rate and the average
hiring policy. The curves are generated by solving the model for different levels of the hiring
cost c in the interval [0.1, 0.9]. Two notable features stand out in this diagram. First, the
curve from the scale-free network is significantly distant from the other two. Second, the
three curves collapse when h¯∗ = 1. This is quite intuitive when we consider the sampling
process that workers undergo in the LFN. If all firms set hiring policies near 1, the likelihood
of getting a job depends mostly on the investment shocks, which happen uniformly across
firms. In this situation, a job seeker at a firm with few edges has almost the same chance
of finding a job as a worker at a firm with many connections. This also relates to the
dispersion of {h∗i }Ni=1 because when firms hire all applicants there is no diversity of hiring
policies, which cancels out the effect of the LFN.
Panel B in fig. 3 shows the employer-size premium across the three networks. It is clear
that the network with largest degree heterogeneity also has the largest wage dispersion. The
topology of the network does not shift the L−w curve so we cannot expect significant changes
in the average wage due to network structure. Panel C demonstrates the interaction between
firms’ hiring behavior and their neighbors’. As suggested in eq. (20), there is a negative
relationship between h∗i and h¯
∗
Γi
. These correlations are clustered by levels of h∗i and their
dispersion is larger in the scale-free network.
As shown in panel D of fig. 3, firms with more edges tend to set lower hiring policies.
The mechanism is simple: with more neighbors, Ai grows and so does i’s demand for labor.
More demand implies a higher wage to be paid by the firm, which shifts its profit curve
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to the left. In order to compensate for higher salaries, the firm needs to re-adjust h∗i to a
lower level. Finally, as predicted by eqs. (4) and (9), firms with higher connectivity tend
to be larger and have more associated unemployed agents. In addition, the network with a
Pareto degree distribution also exhibits a larger firm size dispersion.
4.2 Empirical Networks
We would like to conclude by analyzing real-world LFNs and learning something about
the empirical implications of their topologies. For this purpose, we calibrate the model to
match the observed aggregate unemployment rates of Finland throughout 20 years, while
controlling for its LFNs and separation rates. In order to estimate λ, we make use of our
last theoretical result
Proposition 7. The steady-state average number of unemployed who become employed after
being associated to a firm i that follows eqs. (2) and (3) is
Oi = ϕhih¯Γiki. (22)
The proof follows from the fact that, in the steady-state, Oi = λLi (see appendix). The
intuition is simple: we can consider firm-specific unemployment as a pool of people that is
constant through time. The inflows into Ui are λLi while the outflows are Oi. In order for
Ui to be constant, the inflows and the outflows must be equal.
Taking advantage of eq. (22), we use the steady-state condition Oi = λLi in order to
estimate the model
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Outcomes on Different Network Topologies
Equilibrium solutions for an example calibration: {N = 200, H = 4000, λ = .05, y = 1, v = .8, c = .1,
κ = .5, b = 1 }, and different network topologies with the same average degree of 6. The solution for the
network with a Dirac delta degree distribution was obtained through eq. (21), while the ones for the binomial
and Pareto degree distributions were obtained numerically. Panel a shows the solutions for different levels
of c. The rest of the panels show the cross-sectional variation of the solution for representative networks.
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Oi = βλLi + i, (23)
where βλ = λ. We calibrate the model to a daily frequency, so the estimated separation
rate becomes βˆdλ = 1− (1− βˆλ)
1
365 (see appendix).
During the calibration process, we want to avoid trivial solutions such as homogeneous
sets of hiring policies. This is so because homogeneity misses important empirical regulari-
ties, for example, wage dispersion, heterogeneous firm sizes, and the employer-size premium.
We use parameters c, κ, and b for this purpose. As previously discussed, b allows wage dis-
persion, so an inelastic labor supply is desirable in order to generate heterogeneous hiring
policies. Parameter c determines the overall level of wi, hence of h
∗
i . Finally, κ limits the
maximum wi by making the firm more sensitive to the investment shocks, even when it is
closed. We normalize y = 1 and allow v to be a degree of freedom to calibrate the model
and match the observed level of aggregate unemployment.
Once calibrated, we use the model to compute a counter-factual. This counter-factual
consists of evaluating the model under a different network structure, while keeping every-
thing else constant. Put it differently, we estimate what would be the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate in Finland if the frictions of the labor market would have a homogeneous structure
(an implicit assumption in aggregate job search models). In other words, we compute ag-
gregate unemployment when ki = k, which is given by eq. (13), where h
∗ corresponds to the
solution of the homogeneous case in eq. (21). We perform this exercise for different supply
elasticities in order to gain some insights about the minimum and maximum effects of the
network topology.
Figure 4 shows the difference in aggregate unemployment between the fitted model and
the counter-factual. We present results for three levels of supply elasticity3. As discussed
previously, a more inelastic labor supply generates more wage dispersion, which contributes
3The bump in the counter-factual of 1997 is caused by an anomaly in the data. Due to changes in data
administration, 1997 registers a substantial increase in N (see table 1). Most of these firms have ki = 1, so
the average degree drops nearly 50% with respect to 1996.
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to a larger difference in unemployment between the real LFN and the regular network. We
interpret this difference as the contribution of the network structure to aggregate unem-
ployment. Under a very elastic labor supply, the contribution is marginal. However, if the
supply is highly elastic, the contribution of the network topology can account for more than
90% of the unemployment rate. Given that real economies exhibit wage dispersion, the LFN
is likely to have a significant effect on aggregate unemployment.
Naturally, any aggregate model (implying a regular network) could also be calibrated to
match the empirical level of unemployment. Then, the counter-factual of a heterogeneous
network structure yields a higher unemployment rate. The important point in this exercise is
that, if one would like to predict unemployment after a change in parameters, it is likely that
the aggregate model will underestimate the change in unemployment because the underlying
homogeneous structure is less sensitive. Furthermore, the heterogeneous structure of the
LFN is observed from empirical microdata on how labor is actually reallocated, something
omitted when aggregating the matching process. Therefore, further investigations in the
direction of job search on networks would be desirable in order to better understand labor
dynamics and the limitations of aggregate approaches.
Finally, the LFN topology not only affects the level of aggregate unemployment, but
also its variation through time. In this exercise, it is evident that more degree heterogeneity
also increases the magnitude of annual variations of the unemployment rate. This is an
important result considering that the origins of unemployment volatility is a highly debated
topic (Mortensen and Nagypa´l, 2007; Pissarides, 2009; Shimer, 2010; Obstbaum, 2011). If
structural changes or shocks take place (e.g., changes in λ or v), the labor reallocation process
is smoother on a regular structure than on a heterogeneous one. This is quite intuitive
when thinking in terms of job search as a gradual navigation on a network. A shock or a
structural change generates heterogeneous adjustments of hiring policies when the network
is not regular (and assuming wage dispersion). If the LFN has firms that concentrate
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Unemployment and Counterfactuals
The diamonds correspond to the observed annual aggregate unemployment rate. The grey line was obtained
by calibrating the model to match the observed unemployment rates of each year using parameter values:
y = 1, c = .1, κ = .5, and H = 2, 000, 000 (the size of the Finnish labor force). N is the number of firms in
the data, λ was estimated form the data, and v varies between years due to the fitting procedure.
many connections, labor reallocation becomes susceptible to the congestion effects that
these companies generate by re-adjusting their hiring policies. In a regular topology the
reallocation process is smoother because the shock or structural change generates the same
re-adjustment across all firms, which happens to have the same number of employees and
associated unemployed. Therefore, the LFN points towards the need to understand the
propagation of shocks and structural changes through the gradual reallocation of labor that
takes place on the network, something that we leave for future work.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We developed a framework to study aggregate unemployment from new network-theoretic
micro-foundations of job search as a gradual navigation process on a LFN. The framework
allows to study the composition of aggregate unemployment with a resolution at the level
of each firm. It also shows that an externality emerges between neighbor firms: ‘my growth
affects yours. We found that when labor is reallocated through networks with degree het-
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erogeneity, hiring policies correlate negatively through the LFN. Depending on the elasticity
of the labor supply, the model generates wage dispersion and the topology of the LFN con-
tributes in a significant way to the level of aggregate unemployment. This means that the
way in which labor market frictions are structured (the network topology) plays a central
role in the process of labor reallocation because this structure reshapes the pathways that la-
bor uses to navigate through different firms. Through their hiring behavior, firms modulate
the flows of labor, generating pockets of local unemployment and congestion effects. This
framework provides a rich and elegant, description of decentralized labor markets with the
possibility of preserving important information that is lost through aggregate approaches.
Our theory is empirically supported by comprehensive micro-data on employer-employee
matched records. It suggests that the role of firm connectivity is key to link individual firm
dynamics to aggregate unemployment. Moreover, we found that, in the case of Finland,
the structure of the LFN may account for most of the aggregate unemployment rate. The
framework also provides a new way to estimate separation rates and hiring policies. In
addition, our results suggest that the collection of new information such as firm-specific
unemployment could be useful to complement our knowledge about aggregate unemploy-
ment and the role of labor policy. For example, it could shed new light on the origins of
unemployment volatility and mismatch unemployment.
On the theoretical side, the LFN framework can be employed to consider firm-specific
phenomena. In addition, this framework is particularly well suited to study the propagation
of local shocks and structural changes, a major issue in labor policy discussions. Its localized
nature allows it to be implemented through other methods such as computer simulation and
agent-computing models (Freeman, 1998; Geanakoplos et al., 2012) in order to study the
impact and timing effects of specific policies. This facilitates the study of a richer set of
problems that are difficult to address from an aggregate perspective. For example, we could
use employer-employee matched records to calibrate an agent-computing model with the
real LFN and then simulate local shocks to groups of firms. The computational model
would allow us to obtain information about how labor would flow out of the affected parts
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of the economy, and gradually find its way to firms with better employment prospects.
Characterizing this gradual navigation process would be extremely helpful in designing
policies that aim not only to alleviate unemployment, but to smooth transitional phases of
the economy.
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
Proof of proposition 1
Let pi(t) and qi(t) be the probabilities of being employed and unemployed at firm i in period
t respectively. Both quantities are dynamically described by
pi(t) = (1− λ)pi(t− 1) + hi
∑
j∈Γi
qj(t− 1)
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
) 1∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣ , (24)
and
qi(t) = λpi(t− 1) + qi(t− 1)
∑
γ 6=∅
Pr(γi)
1
|γi|
∑
j∈γi
(1− hj) + Pr(γi = ∅) + (1− s)
 , (25)
where γ
(i)
j indicates a configuration of open and closed neighbors of j, such that i is open.
The symbol {γ(i)j } denotes the set of all possible configurations of open and closed neighbors
of j where i is open. The set γi contains all open neighbors of i, and we denote ∅ the set of
neighbors of i when all of them are closed.
In the steady-state, pi(t) = pi(t − t) = pi and qi(t) = qi(t − t) = qi. Note that∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi) + Pr(γi = ∅) = 1, so the system defined by eqs. (24) and (25) becomes
0 = −λpi + hi
∑
i∈Γi
qj
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
) 1∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣ (26)
0 = λpi − qi
∑
γ 6=∅
Pr(γi)h¯Γi . (27)
From eq. (27), let us write qi in terms of pi as
qi =
λ
s
∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
pi, (28)
and then substitute pi with eq. (26) to obtain
qi =
∑
i∈Γi
qjhi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
)
/
∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
, (29)
To understand this further, we write the previous equation in matrix form making use
of the adjacency matrix of the graph, A, for which Aij = Aji = 1 if i and j have an edge
43
connecting them, and zero otherwise. This produces the expression
N∑
j=1
Aij hi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
)
/
∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
− δ[i, j]
λpj = 0 (30)
for all i. This represents a homogeneous system of linear equations, which always has the
trivial null solution, and has non-trivial solutions if and only if the matrix contained inside
brackets is singular which, among other things, implies that the matrix does not have full
rank. To show that our model has non-trivial solutions indeed, we define the matrix Λ,
with element Λij corresponding to the expression inside brackets
Λij := Aij
hi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
)
/
∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
− δ[i, j]. (31)
This matrix does not possess full rank as can be explicitly seen from the fact that all columns
add to zero. To show this, we first sum Λij over i
N∑
i=1
Λij = −1 +
N∑
i=1
Aij
hi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
)
/
∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣∑
γ 6=∅ Pr(γi)h¯Γi
(32)
where −1 comes from −∑i δ[i, j]. We can now show that the numerator and denominator
of the second term are indeed equal. To see this in detail, we organize the elements of {γ(i)j }
by cardinality |γ(i)j |, and rewrite the numerator as
N∑
i=1
Aijhi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr(γ
(i)
j )/|γ(i)j | =
|Γj |∑
c=1
1
c
∑
i
Aijhi
∑
|γ(i)j |=c
Pr(γ
(i)
j ), (33)
where the last sum is over all elements of {γ(i)j } with equal size c. Now, the sum over i
guarantees that each neighbor of j belonging to a particular γ
(i)
j is summed, along with the
corresponding hr, where r ∈ γ(i)j . Therefore, the sum over i can be rewritten as
∑
i
Aijhi
∑
|γ(i)j |=c
Pr(γ
(i)
j ) =
∑
|γj |=c
∑
r∈γj
hr
Pr(γj) (34)
and inserting this into the sum over c leads to
|Γj |∑
c=1
1
c
∑
|γj |=c
∑
r∈γj
hr
Pr(γj) = ∑
γj 6=∅
∑
r∈γj hr
|γj | Pr(γj) =
∑
γj 6=∅
〈h〉γjPr(γj) (35)
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Therefore,
N∑
i=1
Aijhi
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr(γ
(i)
j )/|γ(i)j | =
∑
γj 6=∅
〈h〉γjPr(γj) (36)
which means that for all j, eq. (32) is identically zero, guaranteeing that the system has
non-trivial solutions.
Since the matrix for a connected graph has rank N−1, its kernel is one-dimensional, and
thus, to choose a unique solution that belongs to the kernel of Λ we need a single additional
condition. In our case, this condition corresponds to
N∑
i=1
(pi + qi) = 1, (37)
which guarantees that each individual is either employed or unemployed and associated to
only one firm each period. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 2
Let us consider eqs. (26) and (27) and note that the probability Pr(γi) of obtaining a specific
configuration γi of open and closed neighbors follows the binomial v
|γi|(1− v)ki−|γi|. Then,
we obtain that
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr(γ
(i)
j )/|γ(i)j | →
kj∑
|γ(i)j |=1
(
kj − 1
|γ(i)j | − 1
)
v|γ
(i)
j |(1− v)kj−|γ(i)j |
|γ(i)j |
=
1− (1− v)kj
kj
. (38)
For the sum
∑
γj 6=∅ h¯ΓiPr(γj), we note that each hiring policy hi for i ∈ Γj appears( kj−1
|γj |−1
)
times among all the terms where there are |γj | open neighbors to j. We can then
write
∑
γj 6=∅
h¯ΓiPr(γj)→
kj∑
|γj |=1
(
kj − 1
|γj | − 1
)∑
i∈Γj hi
|γj | v
|γj |(1− v)kj−|γj | = h¯Γi(1− (1− v)kj ), (39)
where h¯Γi :=
∑
i∈Γj hi/kj , i.e., the average hiring policy of the full neighbor set of j.
Therefore, eqs. (26) and (27) simplify into
0 = −λpi + hi
∑
i∈Γi
qj
1− (1− v)kj
kj
(40)
0 = λpi − qih¯Γi [1− (1− v)ki ]. (41)
It is easy to see by inspection that the solution to the system is
pi =
χhih¯Γiki
λ
(42)
qi =
χhiki
1− (1− v)ki (43)
χ =
1∑
i hih¯Γiki
[
1
λ +
1
h¯Γi [1−(1−v)ki ]
] . (44)
Given that the workers’ actions are independent from each other, the evolution of the
firm size follows the binomial
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Pr(Li) =
(
H
Li
)
pLii (1− pi)H−Li , (45)
so the steady-state average firm size Li (abusing notation) is
Li = Hpi =
ϕhih¯Γiki
λ
, (46)
where ϕ = Hχ. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 3
Consider the probability ai(t) that a worker submits a job application to firm i in period
t. This depends on: the probability qj(t − 1) of being unemployed in a neighbor j ∈ Γi
during the previous period; on the probability Pr(γ
(i)
j ) of j having a configuration γ
(i)
j of
open of closed neighbors in which i is open; and on the probability of choosing i over all
other alternative neighbors of j. Accounting for all possible events and configurations of
neighbors, this probability is written as
ai(t) =
∑
j∈Γi
qj(t− 1)
∑
{γ(i)j }
Pr
(
γ
(i)
j
) 1∣∣∣γ(i)j ∣∣∣ . (47)
In the steady-state ai(t) = ai(t − 1) = ai and qi(t) = qi(t − 1) = qi, and by replacing
eqs. (38) and (43) we obtain
ai = χh¯Γiki. (48)
Since the workers’ behaviors are independent from each other, the number of job appli-
cations received by firm i in any period follows the binomial
Pr(Ai) =
(
H
Ai
)
aAii (1− ai)H−Ai , (49)
so the steady-state average number of applications Ai (abusing notation) is
Ai = Hai = ϕh¯Γiki, (50)
where ϕ = Hχ. Ai fulfills the steady-state balance condition λLi = hiAi. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 4
Let us consider the steady-state solution for the probability qi of being unemployed and
associated to firm i, as written in eq. (43). Given that the workers’ actions are independent
from each other, the evolution of the firm-specific unemployment follows the binomial
Pr(Ui) =
(
H
Ui
)
qUii (1− qi)H−Ui , (51)
so the steady-state average firm-specific unemployment Ui (abusing notation) is
Ui = Hqi =
ϕhiki
1− (1− v)ki , (52)
where ϕ = Hχ. Q.E.D.
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Proof of proposition 7
Consider the probability oi(t) that a worker associated to firm i finds a job at a different
firm in period t. This event depends on: the probability qi(t − 1) that the worker was
unemployed and associated to firm i ∈ Γj during the previous period, on the probability
Pr(γi) of i having a configuration γi of open of closed neighbors; and on the probability of
choosing one particular firm over all other alternatives available in Γi. Altogether, these
factors constitute probability
oi(t) = qi(t− 1)
∑
γi 6=∅
Pr (γi)
1
|γi| . (53)
In the steady-state oi(t) = oi(t − 1) = oi and qi(t) = qi(t − 1) = qi, and by replacing
eqs. (39) and (43) we obtain
oi = χhih¯Γiki. (54)
Since the workers’ behaviors are independent from each other, the number of i’s outflows
in any period follows the binomial
Pr(Oi) =
(
H
Oi
)
oOii (1− oi)H−Oi , (55)
so the steady-state average outflows Oi (abusing notation) is
Oi = Hoi = ϕhih¯Γiki, (56)
where ϕ = Hχ. Oi fulfills the steady-state balance condition Oi = λLi. Q.E.D.
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Estimation of Separation Rates for Finland
Year βλ N R
2
1988 0.188*** 34,279 0.407
(2.900e-02)
1989 0.102*** 32,771 0.301
(2.224e-02)
1990 0.105*** 25,260 0.246
(2.442e-02)
1991 0.049*** 19,143 0.252
(9.445e-03)
1992 0.028*** 16,810 0.141
(4.575e-03)
1993 0.188 17,667 0.174
(1.270e-01)
1994 0.150* 20,756 0.279
(7.513e-02)
1995 0.068*** 21,012 0.151
(1.759e-02)
1996 0.059*** 24,076 0.382
(6.019e-03)
1997 0.065*** 51,493 0.509
(8.652e-03)
1998 0.088*** 31,322 0.281
(1.590e-02)
1999 0.208* 33,648 0.409
(8.141e-02)
2000 0.154** 34,008 0.342
(4.993e-02)
2001 0.088*** 33,331 0.323
(1.667e-02)
2002 0.066*** 33,031 0.376
(1.103e-02)
2003 0.070*** 33,842 0.367
(1.041e-02)
2004 0.592*** 35,924 0.609
(1.528e-01)
2005 0.074*** 41,978 0.415
(1.029e-02)
2006 0.127*** 44,403 0.524
(3.286e-02)
2007 0.086*** 42,767 0.470
(1.171e-02)
Table 3: Estimation of annual separation rates for Finland via eq. (23). Robust standard
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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